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This article highlights some key issues 
discussed in the author’s new book, Reining 
in the Competition for Capital, which is 
available now from the Upjohn Institute. Read 
the fi rst chapter at http://www.upjohninstitute
.org.
In early 2007, North Carolina “won” 
a $600 million Google server farm at 
a cost of around $260 million in tax 
abatements and grants by the state, the 
city of Lenoir, and Caldwell County. The 
city and county forgave 100 percent of 
Google’s business property taxes and 
80 percent of its real estate taxes for 
three decades, even though Google will 
create only 210 jobs, many of which 
require advanced degrees that only a 
fraction of current residents possess. In 
negotiating the deal, Google demanded 
that lawmakers keep its name secret from 
the public, even from residents who were 
asked to sell their homes and properties 
for the project. 
This case is typical of heightened 
global incentive competition in which 
companies face off against state and 
local governments in a “market for 
jobs.” Increasingly, state governors and 
local mayors in countries as diverse as 
Australia, Brazil, and India are being 
pressed for similarly large grants and 
tax breaks under conditions of minimal 
transparency and where governments 
lack expertise to make good deals. 
And in large metro areas, similarly 
huge sums are bid to infl uence where 
low-wage retailers like Wal-Mart and 
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Cabela’s locate, with no net benefi t to 
the region and negative consequences for 
existing smaller retailers. 
Are incentives good, bad, or a mixed 
bag, and how do we know? In Reining 
in the Competition for Capital, top U.S. 
scholars and practitioners working on this 
issue explore the reasoning, evidence, 
and practice under incentive competition. 
Though working from disparate 
disciplines and points of view, all oppose 
either banning incentives altogether 
or continuing with the status quo. 
Rather, we argue, effective economic 
development requires strenuous reforms 
to produce good, long-term jobs and 
improve effi ciency and equity in the 
process.
The Reasoning
There are three schools of thought 
regarding incentive competition. One 
school, stated succinctly by Burstein and 
Rolnick (1995), argues that incentives 
are both ineffi cient (they transfer 
consumer surplus to fi rms that would 
locate there anyway and interfere with 
optimal siting) and inequitable (they 
impose tax and public service burdens 
on existing fi rms and residents). This 
camp proposes that Congress tax away 
all such incentives, rendering them 
ineffective. Another school, an analogue 
to the famous Tiebout hypothesis about 
fi scal competition among fragmented 
local governments, argues that the status 
quo is effi cient and should be left as is.1 
The intricate logic of these positions is 
explored in the Markusen and Nesse and 
Thomas chapters of the book.
A third school of thought argues that 
in an integrating world economy where 
central governments are devolving 
responsibility for economic development 
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Effective economic development 
requires strenuous reforms 
to produce good, long-term jobs 
and improve effi ciency 
and equity in the process.
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1989 10.2 9.4 8.8 8.4 7.5 5.5
2002 11.4 10.3 9.6 8.8 7.3 5.2
Change (%) +1.2 +0.8 +0.7 +0.4 −0.1 −0.3
Table 1  State and Local Taxes as Shares of Family Income
NOTE: Tax burdens are shown after the federal offset; that is, these are the net burdens on families 
after taking into account the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal returns for those who 
itemize (generally higher-income taxpayers).







1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Average share: 1975–1989: 8.6 1990–2005: 6.3
Figure 1  Corporate Income Tax as a Percent of Total State Tax Revenue, 1975–2005
onto lower-level governments, often 
without the resources to do so effectively, 
we have no choice but to champion state 
and local governments’ rights to shape 
their relatively open economies. Bartik, 
in his chapter, argues that increasing local 
employment can yield substantial net 
social benefi ts, especially if jobs go to 
existing local residents, if costs of serving 
incentivized businesses is less than the 
new revenues they generate, and if no 
better uses of public resources are on the 
horizon.
But the market for jobs and tax 
base is rife with failures, the authors 
in this collection say. Multilocational 
companies, the suppliers of jobs, control 
crucial information in the deal-making 
process and have greater power in 
bilateral negotiations. Through the 
remarkable rise of site consultancy as an 
intermediating institution, Markusen and 
Nesse argue, they are able to informally 
collaborate in extracting spending and 
tax breaks, while the public sector agents 
bidding for jobs are unable or are too 
intimidated to share information with 
each other. The result is a strong bias 
toward overestimating benefi ts, according 
to Bartik. Furthermore, the fl urry over 
deal making obscures a longer-term 
erosion in the business share of public 
sector revenues and often impoverishes 
“winning” local governments’ future 
operating budgets, especially if fi rms fail 
or decamp in a short time for even lower-
cost locations.
The Evidence
There are few long-term studies or 
data with which to evaluate promised 
jobs and tax base increments envisioned 
in deals of the past, but hard-hitting 
analyses are emerging. A path-breaking 
analysis of a recent North Carolina 
economic development initiative 
involving more than $1 billion in public 
sector liabilities found that only 4 
percent of the jobs created were actually 
induced by the program at an exorbitant 
cost of nearly $40,000 per job (Luger 
and Bae 2005; Schweke chapter). In a 
pioneering study of 366 Ohio expansions 
between 1993 and 1995, Gabe and 
Graybill (2002) fi nd that those receiving 
incentives overannounced employment 
targets but created no new jobs (in fact, 
reduced overall jobs), while those that 
did not receive incentives accurately 
forecast their job expansion and did 
create new jobs. Studying the extent to 
which incentives create jobs for existing 
residents, Bartik (1993) fi nds that in the 
long run, about 80 percent of new jobs in 
local economies go to outsiders.
The corporate income tax share of 
state revenues, Fisher’s chapter shows, 
has dropped by 40 percent between 1980 
and recent years (Figure 1), an erosion 
he attributes largely to rising incentives 
and related changes in taxation practices 
aimed at competitiveness. As a result, a 
larger share of the public sector service 
burden, including that provided to fi rms, is 
borne by households in the form of sales 
and property taxes. Since these are highly 
regressive taxes, the net result is to shift 
the tax burden from the highest income 
households to the lowest (Table 1). 
Reforming the Market for Jobs
The authors document many 
encouraging experiments for improving 
incentive competition currently in place 
as well as reform proposals for federal, 
state, and local levels. Sinnaeve, a top 
regulator of incentive competition at the 
European Commission, explains lucidly 
how the EU system of deterrence works. 
EU members are prohibited from giving 
incentives to fi rms except under certain 
circumstances and only then if they 
SOURCE: Data prior to 1991 from U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(1992, p. 120); data for 1991–2005 from U.S. Census Bureau (2006).
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apply to the Commission for permission. 
The exceptions involve less-developed 
regions, which may offer certain types 
of incentives—for training, research, and 
technology, for instance—to encourage 
new plants and offi ces. The EU system 
largely deters governments from bidding 
wars for existing plants, because under 
most circumstances, they would simply 
not be permitted. While the regulatory 
process is expensive, it restrains 
tremendous distortions and giveaways 
in business sitings worth many times its 
cost. 
In the United States, many state 
and local governments have designed 
reporting requirements that raise 
transparency in bargaining and awards. 
Others have pioneered performance 
requirements in written contracts, often 
with penalties and repayment provisions. 
Weber, in her chapter, explores many of 
these and shows how they enable public 
sector economic developers, like good 
customers in any market, to get a better 
deal. She shows that some governments 
plan in advance what they want and 
are prepared for sudden requests and 
bidding wars, invest their public dollars 
in place-based assets rather than fi rm-
based ones, and extend benefi ts only 
after fi rms have produced the jobs they 
promise. Clawbacks—requirements that 
fi rms that renege on contracts pay back 
some or all of the incentives—and job 
quality standards are increasingly being 
incorporated into deals, as is school board 
input on abatements and tax increment 
fi nancing (the devotion of future tax 
revenue from increased property values 
to paying off bonds for improvements). 
Incentive reform is a big and 
incremental project at local, state, and 
federal levels. Sunshine, claims LeRoy 
in his chapter, is the best antiseptic. He 
reviews the 12 states that already have 
some form of incentive disclosure, a few 
of those—Virginia, Maine, and North 
Carolina—include corporate income tax 
breaks. He also recommends disclosing 
state taxes paid to corporate shareholders. 
LeRoy argues that the adoption of state 
unifi ed development budgets would 
enable citizens and decision makers to 
see the combination of spending and tax 
expenditures involved in all programs, 
as a public interest group in Kentucky 
has pioneered for their state (Mountain 
Associates for Community Economic 
Development 2005). Markusen and Nesse 
and LeRoy recommend legally defi ning 
site consultants as lobbyists, blocking 
success fees that tend to escalate deal 
dollars, and ending dual agency and other 
practices that exacerbate market failures.
States can also restrain the 
contribution of incentives to sprawl. 
To curtail the economic war among the 
suburbs for retail, LeRoy recommends 
that states ban retail subsidies altogether 
except in depressed inner-city markets 
that are demonstrably underserved. 
The federal government could 
considerably moderate incentive 
competition by creating federal carrots 
against job piracy. LeRoy notes that 
federal program funding has been held 
up to induce states to raise legal drinking 
ages and implement school reform.  A 
share of economic development funding 
from the Federal Departments of 
Commerce and Labor could be held until 
states adopted certain reforms. 
Overall, these seminal papers respond 
to a growing crisis in state and local 
fi nance, where high-profi le recruitments 
cost community too much for the jobs 
created, or worse, leave them holding 
the debt bag when fi rms fail to perform. 
State and local responsibility for 
economic development is a growing 
reality everywhere in the world, and 
incentives are among the most powerful 
tools available. Like any market, this one 
would benefi t from clearer information 
and a more level playing fi eld. The 
authors in Reining in the Competition for 
Capital present models, evidence, and 
doable reforms that can help public sector 
economic developers accomplish that 
within the decade.
Note
1. Tiebout (1956) argues that local governments 
in a metropolitan area compete to offer packages 
of public services at the best tax “price,” thus 
optimally allocating resources when residents “vote 
with their feet” in choosing where to live.
Ann Markusen is a professor in the urban and 
regional planning graduate program and director of 
the Project on Regional and Industrial Economics, 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of 
Minnesota.
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